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The fascinating discussion kicked-off by Liav Orgad addresses the interplay between 
the clouds and earth: How do cloud citizens and cloud communities relate to their 
earthly counterparts? 
Arguments by Orgad, Primavera De Filippi, Francesca Strumia, Peter Spiro and 
Dora Kostakopoulou espouse the potential benefits of global citizenship, ordained by 
the clouds, and cloud communities that such global citizens can form, inhabit and 
govern. Counterarguments by Rainer Bauböck, Robert Post, Michael Blake, Costica 
Dumbrava, Yussef Al Tamimi, Jelena Dzankic, Lea Ypi and Dimitry Kochenov suggest 
that what happens in the cloud stays in the cloud, and may not be helpful or relevant 
to, or at least cannot substitute for, earthly dominions, due to fundamental 
differences between the two. I will try to counter these counterarguments. 
A key introductory point made by Bauböck is that Orgad “must have some form of 
global federal democracy in mind”, yet that “his main vision is, however, the 
emergence of alternative forms of political community at the sub-global level”. It is 
this main vision of Orgadthat much of the weighty and thoughtful criticism is 
directed at. 
To address it, I recall a strategy from mathematics: When faced with a difficult 
problem, namely a difficult theorem to prove, turn it into an even bigger problem: 
Define a more general and broader theorem, prove it, and then the original theorem 
easily follows as a corollary. This seemingly-paradoxical strategy works sometimes 
since a higher vantage point may offer a clearer view of the crux of the matter. I try 
to apply this strategy here: I will not address criticisms directed at sub-global political 
cloud communities directly. Instead, I will paint a vision of a global democracy, 
enabled by the Internet and the emerging technologies of blockchain and 
cryptocurrencies, explain how subsidiary communities based on shared territory or 
common interests, as envisioned by Orgad, can emerge and operate within it, and 
respond to criticism from this broader and more encompassing perspective. 
From the outset, key criticisms that apply to subsidiary cloud communities do not 
apply to a global democracy, whether on or off the cloud (we note in parenthesis the 
respective critics): It has a clear territory (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Al Tamimi) – Planet 
Earth; it has diverse membership (Bauböck, Blake) – humanity at large; membership 
is involuntary (Bauböck, Post, Al Tamimi, Ypi) and by decree – just as earthly states 
conscript citizens by decree; it has room for political communities “that differ 
profoundly in their interests, identities and ideas about the common good” 
(Bauböck, Al Tamimi); and, due to all the above, it is clearly political (Bauböck, 
Post, Blake, Al Tamimi). Key remaining criticisms not answered by generalising the 
vision to incorporate all of humanity are those related to the use of coercion in 
community governance (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Dumbrava, Al Tamimi), lack of 
inclusivity (Ypi and Kochenov), and the risks of new technology (Dumbrava), which I 
will answer now in turn. 
For our envisioned global democracy to be worthy of its name, it must 
uphold democratic values, including sovereignty, equality, freedom of assembly, the 
subsidiarity principle, transparency, and the conservation of the natural and 
imprescriptible human rights: liberty, property, safety and resistance against 
oppression. 
A fundamental advantage of blockchain technology is that it is the only technology 
to date that can uphold sovereignty: The multitudes participating in the operation of 
the blockchain are its sovereign; no member, third party or outside entity has 
omnipotent “super user” or “administrator” capabilities over the system, and no-one 
can pull the plug on it: it will survive as long as there are interconnected participants 
who are able and willing to continue its operation.[1] Hence, the answer to 
Stefania Milan’s question, “do we really need the blockchain to enable the 
emergence of cloud communities?”, is: Yes, if we want cloud communities to be 
sovereign and not subservient. 
The situation is not as rosy with equality. Governance trepidations of the “cloud 
communities” of the leading cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, which consist 
of their developers, miners and owners, resulted in community breakups termed 
“hard forks”. Hence, second– and third-generation cryptocurrencies attempt to 
address their self-governance from first principles. However, they offer only 
plutocratic solutions, espousing “one coin – one vote” instead of the “one person – 
one vote” principle necessary for equality. It may be ironic, given the thrust of our 
discussion, that the only approach available today to realize equality on the 
blockchain is to piggyback on identities issued by earthly governments. Besides 
defeating the purpose of freeing cloud communities from the grasp of their earthly 
counterparts, this approach cannot mix and match governments or identity-granting 
authorities, lest people with multiple government-issued identities have multiple 
votes in the cloud; and it excludes people, such as refugees, who may be hard 
pressed to present a government-issued identity. 
Realising truthful, unique and persistent global digital identities for all, a 
precondition for making an egalitarian blockchain, is a major open challenge.[2] But, 
for the sake of the vision we wish to paint, please suspend disbelief and assume that: 
(i) a worthy method for granting global digital identities to all has been devised, 
allowing any individual to claim a global identity (which functions as the “attested 
individual identities” Kochenov aspires for); call the rightful owners of such global 
identities global citizens; (ii) unhindered Internet access has been globally recognised 
as a basic civil right and is provided, directly or via a proxy, to any individual wishing 
to become a global citizen. While disbelief regarding the first assumption could be 
discharged in a decade, the second one will take longer. However, stating the goal of 
universal access as a basic civil right, taking concrete steps to implement it 
effectively, and making interim amends to compensate for its temporary lack, are all 
essential for our vision to be legitimate (and to address the justified criticisms of 
exclusion by Ypi and Kochenov). With this in mind, let us explore the vision of 
bringing about a global democracy of global citizens. 
As much as disbelief is suspended, a method for granting global digital identities will 
never be perfect. Hence, the global democracy will have to grapple with fraud (fake, 
duplicate and stolen identities, Sybil attacks), extortion (the $5 wrench attack) and 
negligence (lost/forgotten password). Resolving such matters with due process 
would require a court. Such a court would need to rule according to a constitution. 
And the operation of the court (populated most likely by a combination of people 
and machines) will have to be financed. So we have hardly left the doorstep in our 
journey towards a global cloud democracy, and already discovered that in order to 
realise equality we need a global court, a global constitution, and a global currency. 
That the global democracy needs a currency immediately suggests a cryptocurrency. 
But, how can we entrust the future of humanity to the hands of an environmentally-
harmful[3], plutocratic regime? The answer is of fundamental importance: Current 
cryptocurrencies were architected on the premise that participants are anonymous 
and trustless, and resorted to the deliberately wasteful (Milan) proof-of-work 
protocol to cope with trustlessness. If indeed we have a mechanism for granting 
truthful and unique global digital identities that is reasonably resilient to attacks 
(e.g. at most one third of the global identities are compromisedat any time) then the 
global democracy can deploy an egalitarian and planet-friendly cryptocurrency with 
a democratic governance regime; let’s call such a cryptocurrency a democratic 
cryptocurrency. 
Let’s take stock: We have a democratic cryptocurrency governed by sovereign global 
citizens that are subject to a global court that rules according to a global constitution 
and is financed by the democratic cryptocurrency. This may sound a bit circular, but 
that’s exactly how earthly states finance their operation. For example, the 
democratic cryptoeconomy can be fueled by a universal basic income to all global 
citizens. Income, wealth and transactions could be taxed, progressively if the global 
democracy decides so. Tax revenues would be disbursed to finance the operation of 
the global democracy, in particular the court and the underlying computational 
infrastructure (“mining”), as well as other purposes, according to a democratically-
formed budget. To prevent speculative manipulation of the exchange rate of the 
democratic cryptocurrency, a global central bank may be established, with authority 
to purchase and sell foreign (crypto)currency to hinder such manipulations; the bank 
can similarly set an interest rate. The constitution will have to be updated as the 
global democracy develops, and subsidiary legislation will have to be adopted. So, in 
just a few short paragraphs we have come to realise that the global citizens of a 
global cloud democracy that has its own cryptocurrency and cryptoeconomy will 
have to recreate almost all the functions of earthly states; let’s call this resulting 
specific vision a global cryptodemocracy, to distinguish it from the more general and 
abstract idea of a global democracy. If successful, it would show that a technology 
built with an “underlying philosophy of distributed consensus, open source, 
transparency and community” can be both “highly disruptive” and “serve similar 
purposes as those of states” (Milan); and it could achieve that without a reliance on 
the private sector and corporate capital that would necessitate paying undue 
attention to their interests and lobbying (Milan). 
Additional key criticisms concern the ability of our global cryptodemocracy to 
protect human rights (Bauböck, Blake, Kochenov), collect taxes (Bauböck, Post) and 
in general enforce the rule of the law, given that physical coercion is possible on 
earth but not in the clouds (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Dumbrava, Al Tamimi). To redress 
crimes against global identities, we propose that global identities be realised as 
programmable software agents, aka “smart contracts”, programmed to obey 
certified court orders. Thus, coercion is achieved through design and 
programmability, without violence: If the court determines a global identity to be 
fake, then it can directly order it to terminate; if determined to be a duplicate, then 
it can be ordered to merge into another identity, and if stolen then to change its 
owner. Regarding Milan’s observation that “activism today is characterised by […] a 
tendency to privilege flexible, multiple identities”, we cannot hold the stick at both 
ends: aspire for egalitarian rule of law in a global democracy, and undermine it with 
flexible (and hence unaccountable) and multiple (and hence unfairly privileged) 
identities. 
We propose to integrate the global citizen’s global identity with her 
democratic cryptocurrency wallet into one entity, termed global persona. A global 
persona is the global citizen’s proxy in the cloud: it is entrusted with the global 
citizen’s identity information and crypto-assets, and it performs financial 
transactions and civic duties in the global cryptodemocracy on behalf of the global 
citizen it represents. Being unique and persistent makes a global persona 
accountable for the global citizen it represents. Hence, in addition to the court 
orders described above, a court may also issue fines against a global persona, 
payable immediately from her wallet, or deducted from her future (universal basic) 
income. As the global persona is programmed to obey court orders, no force is 
needed to collect such fines either. Income, wealth and transaction taxes can be 
similarly collected without the use of force, by programming global personas to obey 
the (democratically instituted) tax rules that are in effect. Of course, the court must 
be open to appeals on any decision and transaction. 
A key remaining criticism relates to relying on and overseeing the technologies that 
will underlie our envisioned global cryptodemocracy (Post, Dumbrava). The criticism 
is valid, but is mostly equally valid of any technology on which humanity depends 
today, and there are many. Perhaps one key technological vulnerability is related to 
the democratic process itself, ensuring that elections and more generally voting on 
the blockchain at least stand up to earthly standards. Regarding overseeing 
blockchain technology, blockchain governance is indeed an issue of active research 
and experimentation, with the recognition that a change of underlying technology of 
a blockchain is as akin to, and as grave as, a change of constitution in a democracy. 
The global cryptodemocracy would employ the constitutional approach to its core 
technology, allowing constitutional change by its sovereign global citizens via a 
democratic process. Such a process must dampen the immediacy of Internet 
communication, lest mob dynamics may rule, by employing hysteresis 
measures such as special majority requirements. Recovery mechanisms would also 
be established, and invoked, by democratic decision. 
Let us now consider Orgad’s vision of multiple Cloud Communities with a shared 
concern or ascriptive, thematic or geographic memberships “whose aim is political 
decision-making and in which individuals take part in a process of governance and 
the creation of law.” 
First, we note that all these communities can be subsidiary communities of the 
global cryptodemocracy, potentially with multiple levels of hierarchy (e.g. subsidiary 
animal rights or Bahá’í communities, with their own subsidiary communities based 
on country of residence); that the ability to form them is a manifestation of freedom 
of assembly in the clouds; and that allowing them to conduct their affairs without 
outside intervention is in line with thesubsidiarity principle. 
Second, such communities, within the context of a functioning global 
cryptodemocracy, may have at least one clear political goal: To draft and promote, 
within the parent global cryptodemocracy, policy and legislation that pertain to the 
rights and goals of their (possibly minority) community members. Recall the second 
article of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen: “The goal of any 
political association is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of 
man. These rights are liberty, property, safety and resistance against oppression”. To 
uphold these, the conduct of all subsidiary cloud communities must 
be transparent in order to ensure that no subsidiary community aims to harm the 
liberty, property or safety of other communities or global citizens. 
Third, within these rich and multi-faceted cloud communities, a virtual punishment 
with a global scope against one’s global persona, e.g. temporary suspension or even 
just a public reprimand, applied to all subsidiary cloud communities, would be severe 
indeed. Hence, the higher the value of the subsidiary cloud communities to peoples’ 
lives, the mightier the coercive power of the global cryptodemocracy. 
While we have implicitly assumed an egalitarian, democratic decision-making 
process at the core of global cryptodemocracy and in its subsidiary communities that 
will choose to adopt it, we have not specified this process. Such a mechanism faces 
many challenges, including “tyranny of structurelessness”, “tyranny of emotions”, 
decision-making by “microconsensus” within small cliques (Milan) and many others. 
The question of how to best reach a democratic decision has been investigated 
sporadically for centuries (e.g. by Llull, Condorcet, Borda), and intensively for the last 
70 years within Social Choice theory. Much theory was developed, much confusion 
was sowed, and confidence in democracy has eroded, mainly due to Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem and its follow-on work. I will just hint that adding a taste for 
reality to social choice theory can undo much of this damage and restore trust in 
democratic decision making, on and off the cloud. 
I have aimed to show that a vision of a global cryptodemocracy, with a rich set of 
subsidiary cloud communities, is realisable and have tried to address many of the 
criticisms raised in this debate. But, even if a global cryptodemocracy is realisable, 
and successfully addresses criticism, is it desirable? My personal answer is positive 
for two reasons: First, I believe that, since the days of Kant and even before, the 
proponents of a world government own the moral high ground, and the weakness of 
their position was practical: Until now, for a world government to materialise, local 
governments have to volunteer to cease some of their power; and giving up of 
power is not known to happen voluntarily. Fortunately, earthly democracies are 
sufficiently free so that the formation of a global cryptodemocracy does not require 
their consent. True, dictatorial regimes may prevent their citizens from participating, 
but this would, eventually, be at their own peril, as the interests of their people will 
not be represented as well. And true, the full power of a global cryptodemocracy will 
not be realised until proponents of global democracy become majorities in the 
majority of their respective earthly states. Yet, embryonic as it may be, the global 
cryptodemocracy vision presented here may very well be the only concrete proposal 
towards the ultimate realisation of a global democratic government based on 
currently available technologies. 
And this relates to my second reason. I believe that for representative democracies 
to rebounce from their worldwide decline, they should undergo a major revision and 
adopt the practices of one of the oldest and most successful democracies in the 
world, namely the Swiss federal direct democracy. Given that those in power never 
give it up voluntarily, and that direct democracy disempowers representatives, such 
a major shift cannot happen without a major outside force in its favor. And new 
technology can offer such a force. In particular, political e-parties, formed as 
subsidiary cloud communities of the global cryptodemocracy, sharing the same 
technology and networking to share winning practices and methods, may be able to 
win earthly elections and change earthly democracies for the better. This in turn may 
result in such earthly democracies officially supporting[4] the global 
cryptodemocracy in its rise into a bona fide egalitarian democratic world 
government of all global citizens. 
  
Notes: 
[1] I acknowledge Milan’s point that such interconnectedness (but not the 
computers being connected!) would most-probably be commercially-owned, and 
that it is essential that such interconnectedness be neutral and unhindered, even if 
owned and controlled by private or government interests. Given that, global citizens 
can be the true sovereign of the global democratic blockchain outlined below. 
[2] Disclosure: My team at Weizmann aims to address this global challenge. Note 
that it will not be solved just by achieving broader coverage of local government-
issued IDs. 
[3] Present-day cryptocurrencies are unsustainable, even environmentally-harmful, 
since the proof-of-work protocols that underlie, for example, Bitcoin and Ethereum 
are unfathomably energy-wasteful on purpose: The ongoing operation of Bitcoin 
alone consumes as of today more energy than does the entire state of Israel, with its 
more than 8 million inhabitants. 
[4] For example, a state may create government-attested global personas for all its 
citizens, place them in the escrow of the state notary, and assign them to citizens 
upon their presentation of a government-issued ID. This would immediately turn all 
state citizens into global citizens. A state citizen who already owns a global persona 
will have to merge it with the received government-attested global persona, lest she 
would be guilty of owning duplicate global personas. 
 
 
